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IN THE SUPREME COURT
©I the

STATE OF UTAH
PACIFIC COAST TITLE INSURANCE
COMPANY, a corporation
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs

(
HARTFORD ACCIDENT & INDEMNITY
COMPANY, a corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.
PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL SAVINGS &
LOAN ASSOCIATION, a corporation
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
>

Case No. 8719

Case No. 8720

HARTFORD ACCIDENT & INDEMNITY
COMPANY, a corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.
FELT SYNDICATE, INC.,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
HARTFORD ACCIDENT & INDEMNITY
COMPANY, a corporation,
Defendant and Respondent.

Case No. 8736

REPLY BRIEF OF HARTFORD ACCIDENT
& INDEMNITY COMPANY ON APPEAL

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Hartford deems it advisable to submit a brief reply
to the briefs filed on behalf of the respective plaintiffs
in the above consolidated cases. We shall treat first, the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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points made by Felt on its appeal, and subsequently the
points raised by the various plaintiffs in response to
the contentions of the Hartford. In this brief, we shall
designate the parties in the same manner as followed
in our original brief, and we shall also refer to the record
by the same system of designations.
POINTS TO BE ABGUED
POINT I.
FELT WAS NOT THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST AS
TO THE PORTION OF THE CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT,
WHICH IT ASSIGNED TO WRIGHT-WIRTHLIN.
POINT II.
THE DEFENSE OF ASSIGNMENT WAS PROPERLY
RAISED BY THE HARTFORD IN ITS ANSWER TO FELT'S
COMPLAINT.
POINT III.
THE HARTFORD DOES NOT STAND IN CASSADY'S
SHOES. IT IS NOT BOUND BY HIS KNOWLEDGE, NOR
CAN HIS ACTS OR AGREEMENTS WAIVE RIGHTS OF THE
HARTFORD, OR ESTOP IT FROM ASSERTING RIGHTS FOR
WHICH IT CONTRACTED. IT IS ENTITLED TO STAND
ON THE COVENANTS OF ITS BOND.
POINT IV.
THE SUPPLEMENTAL AGREEMENT DID NOT HAVE
THE EFFECT OF WAIVING PRIOR BREACHES ON THE
PART OF ANY OF THE PARTIES. THE HARTFORD DID
NOT BY SIGNING THE SUPPLEMENTAL AGREEMENT
WAIVE ANY BREACHES UPON THE PART OF FELT OR
PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL.
POINT V.
FELT IS BARRED FROM MAINTAINING ITS ACTION
AND FROM MAINTAINING THIS APPEAL BY THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 10-9-3, U. C. A., 1953.
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POINT VI.
HARTFORD DID NOT ADMIT IN ITS ORIGINAL BRIEF
THAT PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL WAS ENTITLED TO RECOVER ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER.
POINT VII.
HARTFORD DID NOT CLAIM THAT THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE OBLIGEES WERE JOINT AND SEVERAL.
POINT I.
FELT WAS NOT THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST AS
TO THE PORTION OF THE CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT,
WHICH IT ASSIGNED TO WRIGHT-WIRTHLIN.

Felt claims, on its appeal, that notwithstanding that
it had assigned to Wright-Wirthlin 89.6% interest in
its right to receive funds from the miscellaneous account
under the primary construction contract, (Ex. Pr.-2),
that it was nonetheless the real party in interest and
entitled to bring this action. The argument is falsely
premised. The purpose of the real party in interest statutes was not to protect the interest of the equitable owner
of the chose en action, but to protect the obligor. This
court recently said in Shaw v. Jeppson, (Ut.), 239 Pac.
(2d) 745:
"The reason the defendant has the right to
have a cause of action prosecuted by the real party
in interest is so that the judgment will preclude
any action on the same demand by another and
permit the defendant to assert all defenses or
counterclaims available against the real owner of
the cause.''
Felt refers to ancient common law principles, and
then argues, by analogy to the principles of contracts
for the benefit of third party beneficiaries, that it is
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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entitled to bring this action, and that it is the real party
in interest. The analogies upon which it attempts to proceed are false, and whatever may have been the rules
in the ancient common law, the rule has been well established in this jurisdiction, from the beginning of statehood, that the assignee of a chose en action is the real
party in interest, and the one entitled to bring the suit.
In Wines vs. Rio Grande W. By. Co., (Ut.), 33 Pac.
1042, this court said:
"So it is held that an assignee is the real
party im interest, and it is immaterial whether
or not any consideration was actually paid for
the assignment, or whether or not the assignment
was merely made for the purpose of the suit, if it
was in fact made." (Emphasis ours.)
In Wilson v. Kiesel, et al., (Ut.), 35 Pac. 488, this
court said at page 491 :
"The statute of Utah (2 Comp. Laws 1888,
# 3169), declares that every action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest,
except certain cases, which do not in any wise
affect the question at bar. This language does not
admit of doubt as to its meaning. The real party
in interest at the beginning of the action must
prosecute it in his own name. It is not necessary
to enlarge upon the reasons for this rule, or to
cite decisions under it; it is sufficient for us to
know what the law is, and it is our duty to enforce
it,
_
"* * * As the nominal plaintiff, Wilson, had
no judgment or other cause of action against these
defendants when he brought them into court, it is
quite apparent that he cannot, in justice complain
if his action is dismissed at his cost, and the as-
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signee cannot complain, because he has never
sought any judgment against defendants." (Emphasis ours.)
In Anderson vs. Yosemite Mining & Milling
(Ut.), 35 Pac. 502, this court said at page 503:

Co.,

"Upon an examination of the record, we find
that the contention of the .appellant cannot be
sustained. * * * The fact that plaintiff still retained the note in his possession would not deprive the assignee of the right to sue thereon in
accordance with the contract between the parties.
Having authority to sue, Scott and Eemington
could sue one or all of the makers. The assignment carried with it the note and debt evidenced
thereby. Scott and Eemington [the assignees]
were the real parties in interest and entitled to
sue." (Emphasis ours.)
In National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Denver & R. G. R.
Co., (Ut.), 137 Pac. 643, this court said:
"Comp. Laws 1907, #2902, provides: 'Every
action must be prosecuted in the name of the
real party in interest, except that an executor or
administrator, a trustee of ,an express trust, or
a person expressly authorized by statute may sue
without joining with him the person for whose
benefit the action is prosecuted. * * *'
«* # * ^ r p o m e r o y , in his excellent work
on Code Remedies (4th Ed.), #127, in referring
to the rule that all actions should be prosecuted
in the name of the real party in interest, says:
'Not only does the rule prevail when the assignment is absolute and complete and the assignee
is the legal owner of the demand; it prevails with
equal force in cases where the assignment is
simply equitable in its character; and the asDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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signee's title would not have been recognized in
any form by a court of law under the old system,
but would have been purely equitable. Such assignee, being the real party in interest, must bring
the action in his own name.' " (Emphasis ours.)
In Bank of American Fork v. Smith, (Ut.), 140 Pac.
122, this court said at page 125:
"We think that, when the agreement and the
transactions had under it are considered as a
whole, what Mr. Jensen did in obtaining money
from the plaintiff at least amounted to an equitable assignment of the obligations assumed by,
as well as the rights arising under the agreement
to the plaintiff. * * * We have recently held that
under our constitution and statutes the equitable
assignee of a chose in action is the real party in
interest, and may sue as such assignee, notwithstanding that such could not have been done at
common law." (Emphasis ours.)
In Moss v. Taylor, (Ut.), 273 P,ac. 515, this court
said at page 520:
"The assignee of a cause of action is a real
party in interest ,and may prosecute an assigned
cause of action in his own name under the provisions of Comp. Laws Utah 1917, #6495, although
the assignment was made without consideration or
was made solely for the purpose of bringing an
action." (Emphasis ours.)
The rule laid down by this line of decisions has
never been disturbed, and seems now to be so well established that there has been no occasion for this court
to pass upon it in recent years. It follows therefore, that
Felt was not the real party in interest, at least as to
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89.6% of the claim, and the court properly refused to
allow it any recovery on that portion.
Felt attempts to derive comfort from the fact that
Wright-Wirthlin reassigned its rights to Felt by an instrument dated December 20, 1956 (Ex. F-35). This was
the date on which trial of these actions commenced. Felt
did not have this right at the time it commenced suit,
or at any time prior to trial. It could not, by a transaction occurring after the commencement of suit assert
or enforce a right which it did not have at the time suit
was commenced. Wilson v. Kiesel, ( U i ) , 35 Pac. 488.
Moreover, this right had completely lapsed by virtue
of the limitation period provided in the bond as follows:
"5. No suit, action, or proceeding by reason
of any default, whatever, shall be brought on this
Bond after two (2) years from the date on which
the final payment under the contract falls due,
provided, however, that in the event there exists
or is pending any collateral litigation which has
the effect of making it impossible for any Obligee
under this Bond to determine its rights hereunder,
a suit, action, or other proceeding under this
Bond may be instituted within six (6) months
after entry of final judgment in said collateral
litigation." (Ex. Pr.-l)
The collateral litigation necessary to determine the
rights of the obligees on the bond terminated October
5, 1955. (Tit. Co. E. 13). Under the terms of the bond
above set forth, any action against the Surety on the
bond was required to be commenced no later than April
4, 1956. Wright-Wirthlin brought no action within that
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time. It could not breath new life into its stale claim
by assigning it back to Felt,
It should be noted here, that the Hartford interposed
the assignment as a complete defense, since it was a
clear violation on the part of Felt of the primary construction contract (Ex. Pr-2, fl-15). The court did not
treat it as a complete defense, but rather as a partial
defense. The error, if any, was in Felt's favor, and it
has no grounds upon which to complain.
POINT II.
THE DEFENSE OF ASSIGNMENT WAS PROPERLY
RAISED BY THE HARTFORD IN ITS ANSWER TO FELT'S
COMPLAINT.

Felt apparently in desperation, seeks to take refuge
in technical rules of pleading, and asserts that the Hartford's defense of assignment was not properly or timely
raised. We invite the court's attention to paragraph 4
of the fourth defense in our answer to Felt's complaint
(Felt R. 27), wherein the Hartford specifically alleged
that Felt had breached its contract with Cassady by assigning its rights thereunder, directly contrary to the
provisions of the primary construction contract (Ex.
Pr-2, par. 15). We do not know what better notice we
could have given to Felt that we were relying upon the
assignment as a defense. It was clearly and specifically
pleaded.
Felt now complains that this was a plea in abatement, which had to be specially pleaded. That may
have been true under the rules of common law pleading,
but it was not generally true under the Codes, and it
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most certainly is not true under the form of pleading
provided by the Utah Rules. In 41 Am. Jur. at page 397,
the rule in this regard under Code Practice, is stated
as follows:
"Some defenses may now be raised by a general denial that under the common-law system of
pleading required a plea in abatement. An objection that the plaintiff is not the real party in
interest, or that his title to the cause of action
is defective, if not apparent on the face of the
record, is properly made at common law by a
plea in abatement, whereas under the codes a
general denial will serve the purpose" (Emphasis
ours.)
The Utah Rules provide a form of notice pleading.
All that is necessary is to give the adverse party notice
of the claim to be made. We submit that notice was given
in clear and unequivocal language, by express pleading.
If there remains any doubt in the matter, we invite attention to the provisions of Rule 1, U. R. C. P., which
provides, in part, as follows:
"(a) * * * They [the rules] shall be liberally
construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action."
In commenting on a similar provision in the Federal
Rules, it is said in 2 Moore's Federal Practice, pages
56-7:
"In cases construing the Rules courts have
frequently reiterated the maxim of liberal construction. The objective of the Rules has been
variously phrased: (1) 'Decisions are to be on
the merits and not on procedural niceties/; (2)
Ho secure a disposition of litigation on the merits
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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rather than by collateral methodsf (3) Ho reduce
the amount of litigation, to narrow the issues to
avoid surprises and to promote justice'; (4) Ho
achieve uniformity'; (5) 'to avoid a strict technical interpretation which might work a hardship
on the litigants1'; Howsoever worded, liberality
is the canon of construction." (Emphasis ours.)
The fact that the court did not give to this defense
the full effect which we claimed for it, is certainly nothing
about which Felt can legitimately complain. It was fully
apprised that Hartford relied upon the assignment as
a ground of defense, and while the Hartford contended,
and still contends, that said assignment is a complete defense to Felt's action, Felt cannot complain that the
court found it was only a partial defense.
POINT III.
THE HARTFORD DOES NOT STAND IN CASSADY'S
SHOES. IT IS NOT BOUND BY HIS KNOWLEDGE, NOR
CAN HIS ACTS OR AGREEMENTS WAIVE RIGHTS OF THE
HARTFORD, OR ESTOP IT FROM ASSERTING RIGHTS FOR
WHICH IT CONTRACTED. IT IS ENTITLED TO STAND
ON THE COVENANTS OF ITS BOND.

All of the plaintiffs have argued in their briefs,
either inferentially, or directly, that Hartford stands in
the shoes of Cassady, and that because Cassady did or
neglected to do, certain things, Hartford is estopped
from raising, or has waived, defenses which it might
otherwise have. This argument is a fallacy. The surety
limited its undertaking to certain terms and conditions
among which were that Cassady would be paid in accordance with the terms and provisions of the primary
construction contract, and that all of the obligees per-
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form their respective obligations under their respective
contractual agreements.
It is argued that Cassady was aware that Felt's
only source of money was from Prudential Federal, and
that Prudential Federal would not make funds available
until proper contracts were signed and mortgages recorded. From this, it is argued that Cassady should not
have started to build on any particular lot until it was
sold and ,a mortgage recorded, and this, despite the fact
that Cassady was obligated by the express terms of his
contract to go forward within ten days and complete
within six months. Felt of course, knew that Cassady
relied upon the course of construction payments agreed
by Felt to be paid in accordance with the terms of the
primary construction contract. Eegardless of the effect
which Cassady's knowledge had upon his own rights,
(and we do not believe it had any), it could in no way
impair the rights of the Hartford. The Hartford's bond
specifically refers to the construction contract, and must
be construed in light of it. Hartford was entitled to rely
on its terms and provisions. There is nothing in the
record to show that Hartford had any knowledge concerning Felt's limited financial circumstances, or its
inability to perform. Neither is there anything in the
record to show that Hartford at any time waived the
rights for which it contracted in its bond. Eegardless
of any knowledge which Cassady may have had, or anything which Cassady may have done, such action on his
part could not and did not affect the rights of the Hartford since there is no showing in the record that the
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Hartford had such knowledge, or that it acquiesced in,
or consented to such acts.
POINT IV.

THE SUPPLEMENTAL AGREEMENT DID NOT HAVE
THE EFFECT OF WAIVING PRIOR BREACHES ON THE
PART OF ANY OF THE PARTIES. THE HARTFORD DID
NOT BY SIGNING THE SUPPLEMENTAL AGREEMENT
WAIVE ANY BREACHES UPON THE PART OF FELT OR
PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL.
All of the plaintiffs contend or assume, that the
supplemental agreement (Ex. Pr-3), more or less wiped
the slate clean, and that from that point forward the
parties started afresh. In other words, all past sins were
forgiven. This is not true. There is an admission in said
agreement that up to the time of its execution, Prudential
Federal had made payments in accordance with, and
performed its obligations under the loan agreement.
However, the Hartford was not a party to that portion
of the agreement, did not either expressly or inferentially
agree to it, and expressly limited its concurrence in the
.agreement to certain modifications in the primary construction contract. The language of Hartford's concurrence is as follows :
"HARTFORD ACCIDENT AND INDEMNITY COMPANY, as surety on the bond of CASSADY COMPANY, INC., does hereby consent to
amended paragraphs 22 and 23, and 7 of the Construction contract in connection with which its
bond has been given." (Pr-6).
Paragraph 22 of the primary construction agreeDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ment, as modified by the supplemental agreement, was
changed only in the following particulars:
(1) The number of houses to be built under each
of the three different floor plans was changed slightly.
(2) Cassady would be compensated for extras only
if they were agreed to in writing. (Under the original
agreement there was no provision that extras should be
in writing.)
(3) Extras had to be approved by the Veterans
Administration.
Paragraph 23 was amended to give Prudential Federal discretion as to the manner and amounts of payments to Cassady, subject, however to the following
provision:
"In no event, however, shall the payments be
less than those prescribed in this paragraph 23
prior to this amendment."
At no time was there any agreement that failure
to make timely payments should be excused. On the contrary all of the contractual provisions specifically required payments according to a schedule based on course
of construction. It should also be observed, that there is
nothing in the supplemental agreement wherein or whereby any party thereto admits or agrees that Felt had
performed its obligations in accordance with the primary
construction contract. And Felt itself, at page 22 of its
brief, admits that there were breaches.
It was of course, necessary that the Hartford consent to that portion of the supplemental agreement
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wherein the time for completion by Cassady was extended. Had the consent of the Hartford not been obtained, it would have been exonerated from liability
under the bond under familiar principles of suretyship
law. Likewise, it was .advisable, if not absolutely necessary, to obtain the Hartford's consent to the other modifications in the primary construction contract so that
there could be no question of its being exonerated by
reason of changing its terms. However, the Hartford's
concurrence in this agreement was strictly and carefully
limited to those matters. It specifically did not .agree
that Prudential Federal had performed all of its contractual obligations, nor did it admit that .any other
party had performed its contractual obligations, nor
did it waive .any of the rights for which it had contracted
under the specific terms of its bond. Antecedent breaches
were in no wise excused and there is nothing in the
record to show that at the time of the Supplemental
Agreement the Hartford had knowledge of such breaches.
Felt has suggested that by allowing the cost of
renting a power generator as an offset against Felt's
judgment, Felt's breach in failing to provide a power
connection at the inception of the project is thus rectified.
This is analogous to suggesting that a blood transfusion,
administered after the death of the patient, rectifies the
negligence of the physician in failing to give it at the
time of surgery. At the beginning of the project, funds
were sorely needed. A relatively small amount of money
would have kept the project going smoothly. But once
it had turned into a lemon, no amount of money could
have saved it. Like a small cancer, easily eradicated in
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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its initial phases, this project was neglected by the
doctor (Felt) until the cancer metastasized throughout
the body of the victim. By then major surgery could
not cure the patient. Any medicine administered at that
late date could have only a mild pallative effect.
POINT V.
FELT IS BARRED FROM MAINTAINING ITS ACTION
AND FROM MAINTAINING THIS APPEAL BY THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 16-9-3, U. C. A., 1953.

In meeting the contentions made under Point VI
of our original brief, Felt ignores completely the terms
and provisions of Sec. 16-9-3, U.C.A. 1953. Felt seeks to
circumvent our argument by contending that in filing
this law suit and prosecuting this appeal, it is not engaging in business in Utah. That is entirely beside the
point. When Felt entered into this promotion for the
construction of 100 homes, it was beyond the peradventure of any doubt engaging in business in Utah. This
it recognized itself and took the steps to qualify to do
business in this state. Having done so, it was, for the
time it remained properly qualified, entitled to all of
the rights and privileges of any other corporation lawfully doing business in this state. However, when Felt's
franchise was forfeited, it forfeited whatever rights it
had accrued up to that time. Sec. 59-13-61, U.C.A., 1953.
One of those rights was the right to bring actions in
the Utah courts. The disabilities of non-complying foreign corporations are specifically set forth in Sec. 16-9-3,
U.C.A., 1953. One of those disabilities is clearly and unequivocally the right to sue, prosecute or maintain any
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action or suit in any of the courts of this state on any
claim arising out of, or growing out of any contract,
agreement or transaction, made or entered into in this
state by such corporation. The language of the statute
is clear and unequivocal.
The cases cited by Felt, do not in the least support
or tend to support its position. The case of George R.
Barse Livestock Company v. The Range Valley Cattle
Co., et al.} 16 Ut. 59, 50 Pac. 630, simply holds that a
foreign corporation not doing business in this state,
which acquired, outside of this state, a chose en action
against the defendant, a resident of this state, could bring
its action in the Utah courts without qualifying as a
foreign corporation. The case of Mar chant v. National
Reserve Co. of America, 137 Pac. (2d) 331, simply discussed what does and does not constitute the doing of
business in this state, and says nothing whatsoever as
to the disabilities of noncomplying foreign corporations,
and particularly as to their right to use the Utah courts.
Neither case is of any assistance whatsoever in solving
the problems in the case ,at bar.
POINT VI.
HARTFORD DID NOT ADMIT IN ITS ORIGINAL BRIEF
THAT PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL WAS ENTITLED TO RECOVER ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER.

In our original brief, we stated that "the amount of
damages awarded to . . . Prudential Federal and Felt"
was not an issue. We made the statement simply to explain to the court why we did not detail the facts upon
which those plaintiffs' losses were claimed. We certainly
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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did not intend to admit, and we are quite amazed that
anyone would believe that we admitted, by this statement, that the plaintiffs were entitled to damages in
some amount. However, Prudential Federal has seized
upon this statement with such vigor ,and has referred to
it so many times in its brief, that we feel it appropriate
to clarify any doubt or ambiguity which might exist.
WE DO NOT ADMIT THAT PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL OR ANY OTHER PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED
TO RECOVER DAMAGES IN THESE CASES. We
most certainly would not have appealed and prepared
these elaborate briefs had we intended to make any such
admission. All we meant by the statement in our original
brief, was that we do not desire, on this appeal, to attack
the formula by which the court calculated the damages,
the court having first found that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover damages. We do not necessarily admit
that the court's formula was correct. All we say, is that
right or not, we are not questioning it on this appeal.
What we are contending is that the plaintiffs should
not have been awarded any damages, and that judgment
should have been rendered in each case in favor of the
defendant. That is what we contended below, and what
we contend here. We trust that the foregoing will serve
to eliminate or clarify any ambiguity which heretofore
existed as a result of the statement made in our original
brief.
POINT VII.
HARTFORD DID NOT CLAIM THAT THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE OBLIGEES WERE JOINT AND SEVERAL.
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In order to demonstrate that its construction of the
bond is the correct one, Prudential Federal suggests as an
alternative construction an interpretation which it characterized as absurd. We agree. This interpretation is
stated on page 65 of Prudential Federal's brief to be
Hartford's theory. This we disclaim. We have never
contended, and we do not now contend, that the three
obligees on the bond had joint and several obligations to
make payments to Cassady. What we do contend, and
what the bond plainly provides, is that in the event payments are not made to Cassady in accordance with the
terms of the primary contract, that the surety is exonerated from liability to each of the obligees on the
bond. Plainly the Morningside Heights building project
could not succeed unless everyone interested in it faithfully performed his obligations. Quite obviously Felt
and Prudential Federal, and to a lesser degree, the Tille
Company, had it within their power to destroy the success of the project by not complying with their contractual
agreements. Hartford certainly would not have undertaken to secure performance by Cassady without at the
same time contracting for full performance by all of the
other parties. To have done otherwise would have been
little short of madness. In fact Hartford agreed to write
this bond only after a long period of negotiation. While
the Hartford did not require, nor did any contractual
instrument require, that either Prudential Federal or the
Title Company, guarantee payment to Cassady by Felt,
Hartford, in clear and unequivocal language, limited its
liability, and stated that it would not be liable if payDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ments were not made "in reasonable compliance with the
terms of" the construction contract, or if the other obligees failed to perform their obligations. In light of the
circumstances under which the parties contracted, this
provision seems not only reasonable but indispensable.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted, that the plaintiffs have
failed to meet the arguments advanced by the Hartford
in its original brief; that there is no merit to Felt's appeal; and that the judgment of the trial court in each
case should be reversed with directions to enter judgment in favor of the defendant and against each of the
plaintiffs, no cause of action.
Eespectfully submitted,
MORETON, CHRISTENSEN
& CHRISTENSEN
By RAY R. CHRISTENSEN
Attorneys for Hartford Accident
& Indemnity Company.
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